IN THE TASMANIAN INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Industrial Relations Act 1984

This State Wage Case hearing has been somewhat different from others. As part of these proceedings the Commission has been invited to rule on a number of issues relating directly to the revised principles it has been asked by the parties to endorse. In particular we should:

(a) replace the current wage fixing principles with those promulgated by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in its August 1989 decision (Print H9100). These should be refined only to reflect certain amendments considered appropriate having regard for the size of this commission;

(b) consequent on installation of a new set of principles, but as part of this hearing, we have been invited to approve agreed variations to all private sector awards (except the Electrolytic Zinc Award1 and Mining Lead-Zinc Award2 which the parties have agreed should stand over pro tem). Subject to those excluded awards, the variations to apply from date of decision, or 1 October, whichever is the later;

(c) vary all public sector awards in the same way, notwithstanding the fact that there is no agreement;

(d) hear argument from the Pharmacy Guild regarding alleged incapacity of the pharmacy industry in this State to meet the cost of the first instalment applied for as part of these proceedings;

(e) stand over awards covering higher education support staff employed at the Tasmanian State Institute of Technology (TSIT) and the University of Tasmania, pending the outcome of discussions at national level between national union and employer representatives associated with those institutions. This request was founded largely upon the fact that funding for these institutions is from Federal and not State sources;

(f) continue to make provision for continuation of all partheard matters under the previous principles.

Unquestionably the main feature of this case was the agreement announced by the Tasmanian Trades and Labor Council (TTLC) and Tasmanian Confederation of Industries (TCI). We were told agreement had been negotiated in relation to seventy-plus private sector awards even before the new principles were put in place. The agreement itself was for a first instalment adjustment of the appropriate amount or percentage to be applied across the board from 1 October or the date of decision, whichever is the later.

Understandably the TTLC also wished to obtain the same result for public sector awards of which there are some 60 or so. However, this approach was opposed by the Government who argued that no suitable agendas and timetables had been agreed upon to enable the first instalment to be paid. Nevertheless it was conceded that discussions had taken place and were continuing. Indeed it was foreshadowed that given the right amount of co-operation by the relevant employee organisations, it was not beyond the realms of possibility that an agreement for an across-the-board adjustment could result later this year or early next.

The respective position of the parties presents the Commission with a number of dilemmas:

1. The approach by the TTLC and TCI in the private sector is obviously counter to what is envisaged by the principles.

2. The proposals for award restructuring contained in the TTLC/TCI Agreement are no more than broad generalisations relating to measures that may be considered.

3. We were urged by Mr Abey not to make any modifications to the Agreement. He submitted that if we cannot accept the Agreement as is then the parties to it wished to opportunity to have that made known prior to any decision we may make.

4. It appeared to us that a great deal more preparatory work in respect of structural efficiency award variations had been undertaken in the public sector, yet the TTLC was not able to secure an agreement for our consideration for that section of the workforce.

5. Additionally certain private sector awards were set aside from the TTLC/TCI Agreement. In both the EZ3 and the Mining Lead-Zinc4 Awards a great deal of work has been undertaken by the parties to those awards aimed at significant restructuring. Those award areas reflect the type of review envisaged by the structural efficiency principle.

Against this diversity of approach to the practical application of the wage fixing principle that we have endorsed in the course of these proceedings, and in particular the Structural Efficiency Principle we believe it appropriate to make the following comments.

Arguably the decision of the Commission in this State Wage Case is the most important it has had to make in recent times.

It is a decision which we believe must have regard for the direction in wage fixing, supported by the peak union and employer organisations nationally and the Federal government as well as by corresponding State bodies including Tasmania. This direction has centered around restructuring of awards with the culmination in the current wage fixing principles of a predominant focus on structural efficiency.

The preamble to the principles we have adopted as specifically requested by all of the parties, stipulate that the intent of this latest wage fixing package is to provide -

" ... a clear framework under which all concerned - employers, workers and their unions, governments and tribunals - can co-operate to ensure that labour costs are monitored; that measures to meet the competitive requirements of industry and to provide workers with access to more varied, fulfilling and better paid jobs are positively examined; and that lower paid workers are protected."

Accordingly since the Commission and all parties to the present proceedings have agreed to follow the Australian Commission's National Wage Case decision of 7 August, we understand but nevertheless find it difficult to reconcile, the wise departure advocated in these proceedings by the TTLC and TCI.

"The Confederation of Australian Industry (CAI) opposed the ACTU claims and argued that the maximum increase in award rates `should be in the region of two and a half to 3 per cent'. It submitted that such a figure was in line with the trend rate in productivity growth and was the maximum sustainable increase, consistent with moderating inflation, which would not further damage Australia's international competitiveness. CAI argued further that the increase should be in a percentage form; be established as a maximum for each award; be available in at least two instalments; and should not precede implementation of the results of individual structural efficiency exercises."

The radically different approach adopted by these two major State parties in relation to an across-the-board approach as opposed to award by award, was said by the TTLC to be justified "given the nature of Tasmanian awards, the size of the Commission and the resources available generally." And Mr Abey had this to say at page 15 of the transcript -

"Fundamentally, the position of the TCI, so far as the wage fixing principles are concerned, is that we are committed to the position that the structural efficiency principle should be addressed on an award-by-award basis. And as a general rule the concept of across-the-board wage increases is inconsistent with this philosophy.

However, it must be recognised that in most State private sector awards, very little if any work has been done pursuant to this principle, and there are some notable exceptions to the generalisation, which I will be referring to shortly.

This situation is very largely a consequence of the confusion and uncertainty which has, until very recent times surrounded the restructuring debate."

It is also difficult for us to reconcile the fact that both the State Branch of the ACTU and the TCI have taken up opposite positions from those taken by their Federal affiliate bodies, before the Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. We refer to award-by-award exercises on structural efficiency.

This is graphically illustrated by contrasting the present agreement between the two bodies and the following extracts from Print H9100 to be found at page 3 -

"the ACTU claimed increases of $10.00 per week for workers at the basic skills/trainee entry level; $12.50 per week at the semi-skilled worker level; and $15.00 per week or 3%, whichever is the higher, at the tradesman level and above. It submitted that such increases should be available on individual award variation, consistent with the Structural Efficiency Principle, in the first half of 1989/90. It sought further increases of the same order to be available in the second half of 1989/90 and paid no less than 6 months and nor more than 7 months after the first increases. It also sought the provision of a mechanism whereby higher increases might be achieved on a limited basis to meet special circumstances."

(our underlining)

and later:-

"Given this position, the TCI is of the view that to strictly apply the Commonwealth decision would lead to a plethora of hastily conceived restructuring proposals formulated purely with the objective of achieving the first wage increase.

This would, by definition, detract from the quality of the restructuring exercises and the whole wage fixing system could well degenerate into a farce."

Whilst we do not doubt the sincerity of those respective positions, and acknowledge the difficulties which exist, we believe the arguments presented are flawed in two fundamental respects, ie -

1. The parties have had twelve months to co-operate positively in a fundamental review of awards with a view to implementing and improving the efficiency of industry and to provide workers with access to more varied, fulfilling and better paid jobs, and

2. Unless firm measures are in place before the first structural Efficiency Principle increase is granted, then the parties to individual awards will have nothing specific to work on and to be improved, and nothing for the Commission to closely monitor consistent with the main thrust of that principle's purpose and objectives. Yet employees would presumably then have an unjustified expectancy of receiving a similar increase six months after making further application.

More particularly it is timely to remember that the National Wage Case was conducted against an economic background that should concern all Australians. As the Commonwealth put it at page 4 of the Federal decision -

"On the economic front Australia's external imbalances remain serious and wages policy must continue to play a key part in addressing them. The current account deficit and associated external debt remain pre-eminent economic problems. Growth in demand has been much stronger than expected, resulting in inflationary pressures, a delay in expected improvements to the current account deficit and increase in Australia's external debt. Controlling demand pressures and getting the medium term adjustment process back onto track are central objectives of government policy.

They will require among other things reducing inflationary pressures, improving our international competitiveness, and raising productivity while avoiding a wages explosion and recession. This in turn calls for continuing nominal wage restraint as part of an integrated package of accord policies including concerted action to improve labour market flexibility and productivity on a sustained basis."

Add to that the fact of Tasmania's higher than average unemployment and dependence upon both competing for difficult export markets under an added freight burden, and extremely difficult circumstances presently facing tourism associated industries.

In short Tasmania can least of all afford to take the soft options in the current economically difficult environment.

Therefore, and for all the reasons we have stated we are not prepared to accept the agreement for an across-the-board increase in wage rates and allowances in the private sector.

We now turn to closer scrutiny of the representations made to us with respect to varying public sector awards for an across-the-board wage increase from a common operative date.

Because the TTLC had been able to secure such a significant measure of agreement for payment of the first instalment, much of the proceedings before us was devoted to argument regarding public sector awards. The TTLC was firmly of the opinion that these awards should be adjusted by arbitration, if necessary, to pass on to State and other non-private employees the same order of wage improvement as that proposed for private sector employees.

To that end the TTLC and the representatives of the Crown tendered various suggested agenda in support of their respective positions. However the parties remained deadlocked on matters of principle. For its part the TTLC documentation addressed most of the items included in the Government agenda. Whereas the TTLC was happy to acknowledge that the catalogue of items included in its own agenda represented all those matters referred to by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in its decision5. The Government, for its part, argued that they required specific proposals, not just headnotes.

The TTLC responded by submitting that as the State Service was in the process of being restructured and awards were under consideration for the purposes of restructuring also, all that the unions could reasonably agree to in the circumstances was a range of matters upon which it was prepared to negotiate.

This prompted the Government to call evidence from its Senior Economic Adviser, Mr Challen. His evidence included both an explanation and scrutiny of current Budget papers including fiscal prognostications for this and the 1990/91 financial years. The cost of a 6% increase in current money terms, and for a full year, was said to be of the order of $42 million. But that cost could be lessened considerably by productivity improvements of an acceptable kind.

In any event it was said that the current Budget forecast is for a significant deficit. Any additional cost incurred for any reason will therefore exacerbate that position. And while some allowance has been made for the likelihood of the first instalment being paid this financial year, it was certainly not anticipated that this would apply across the board from the date sought by the TTLC and others.

The possibility of a 1990 operative date had been considered, given that negotiations on structural efficiency would sooner or later be expected to make such an adjustment, in all probability, justifiable.

The TTLC objected to the perceived demand for offsets. On more than one occasion it drew attention to the following passage from Print H9100:

"Proposals for changes of this nature should not be approached in a negative cost-cutting manner and should, as far as possible, be introduced by agreement."

Because the expressed view of the Government was that to be acceptable agenda items should result in cost savings, Mr Lennon asserted that the Government's view of the principles had been misconstrued.

We can well understand why the Government might, and indeed should, proceed with some caution in considering wage claims of this dimension. And in passing we note that a huge sum has been reserved to meet the legacy of nurses' salaries together with anticipated further adjustments expected to be awarded by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission if nurses attain professional status. Nevertheless we have some sympathy for Mr Lennon's position. It is no secret that much work has been done on public sector award restructuring, preparation of classification standards and award rationalisation. Clearly the relevant individual unions have done more than pay lip service to the notion of structural efficiency and award restructuring. It is equally true that TTLC Exhibits 4 and 5 need to be more specific.

We are of the opinion that both sides can and should be more flexible. Therefore, we have decided to refrain from finally arbitrating on the merits of the matter at this stage. However we would expect that in the true spirit of conciliation the parties will positively explore the possibility of reaching some accommodation. We would hope that progress in this regard can be reported when next this Bench convenes.

If agreement is out of the question, individual members of this Commission will be requested to monitor and expedite award-by-award consideration commencing immediately. Where an agreement in excess of the limits set out in the principles that we have now endorsed is a likely outcome, that matter will first need to go to an Anomalies Conference to be dealt with as a special case either by a Full Bench or by an individual Commissioner on the determination of the President.

The question of operative date in the circumstances described above will be determined by the Commission. But opting for an award-by-award approach would not necessarily mean that there would automatically be different operative dates. It may be that this Bench may determine that there shall be a common operative date for those public sector awards where it can be demonstrated that the requirements of the Structural Efficiency Principle have been met.

Having reached the conclusions we have in respect of both the private and public sectors we will leave the way open for the parties to present further proposals which may persuade us that the Structural Efficiency Principle has been satisfied to the extent that a first instalment increase is able to be made from an appropriate operative date.

In respect of the public sector as we have already indicated in our opinion there is little separating the parties from achieving significant agendas and timetables which may satisfy the requirements for an initial structural efficiency payment.

With regard to the private sector we have decided to provide the parties to the TTLC/TCI agreement a further opportunity to address us given the submission of the TCI that we do this in the event that the agreement is not accepted in its present form. It may be that the parties are able to provide the Bench with alternative proposals for consideration.

We are indeed mindful of the fact that Tasmania, being a small State, has limited human resources and that this is an inhibiting factor in the processing of structural efficiency exercises.

However, important as that consideration may be in the Tasmanian context, we believe that the requirements of the Structural Efficiency Principle are paramount given this Commission's commitment to the current centralised approach to wage fixation.

Since we have granted no increases at this time the question of exempting designated parts of the Chemists Award does not arise. However we point out that the economic incapacity principle is available and may be utilised by separate applications whenever an increase is granted. The previously well stated criteria of rigorous testing will continue to apply.

Further, we also do not accept arguments presented by Dr Garnham and Mr Buchanan regarding deferral of awards relating to TSIT and University of Tasmania support staff. These awards are awards of this Commission and as such should be dealt with in the same way as any other award. However sympathetic we might be to the difficulties experienced by management of the institutions, were we to be persuaded to somehow make an exception because of the source of funding, it would surely follow that in relation to State employees covered by Federal awards but funded from State sources, the same argument could be presented. Accordingly these awards are not stood over for the purposes of this decision.

In case it is unclear, we now direct the respective controlling authorities of the institutions concerned and the TTLC to confer in the same way as we have directed there be continuation of conferences between the TTLC and State Government sources.

Finally, this Commission's principles are appended. They will apply from the date of decision until either replaced, modified or abandoned.

The current provision regarding substantially part-heard matters will be continued.

We will convene again on 2 November 1989 for the purpose of taking commitments from the parties to private sector and public sector awards.

Immediately following the giving of commitments it may be opportune for the parties to take up the invitation of the Bench to present further proposals in support of the Structural Efficiency Principle consistent with our earlier comments.

ATTACHMENT "A"

THE PRINCIPLES

These principles have been developed with the aim of providing, for their period of operation, a clear framework under which all concerned - employers, workers and their unions, governments and tribunals - can co-operate to ensure that labour costs are monitored; that measures to meet the competitive requirements of industry and to provide workers with access to more varied, fulfilling and better paid jobs are positively examined; and that lower paid workers are protected.

The principles provide that movements in wages and salaries and improvements in conditions - whether they occur in the public or private sector, whether they be award or overaward and whether they result from consent or arbitration - must fall within the level allowable in accordance with the State Wage Case decision of 30 October 1989.

In considering whether wages and salaries or conditions should be awarded or changed for any reason either by consent or arbitration, the Commission will guard against contrived arrangements which would circumvent these principles and their aims.

COMMITMENT

Any claims for improvements in pay and conditions must be processed in accordance with these principles. No adjustments will be approved by the Commission unless a union concerned in an award gives a commitment that it will not pursue any extra claims, award or overaward, except in compliance with these principles.

When this no extra claims commitment is given, it shall be inserted in the award concerned in the following terms:

"It is a term of this award (arising from the decision of the Tasmanian Industrial Commission in the State Wage Case of 30 October 1989) that the union(s) undertake(s), for the duration of the principles determined by that decision, not to pursue any extra claims, award or overaward, except when consistent with those principles."

WAGE ADJUSTMENTS

1.       Structural Efficiency Adjustment

There will be allowable under these principles:

(i) a first increase of $10.00 per week for workers at the basic skills/trainee level; $12.50 per week at the semi-skilled worker level; and $15.00 per week or 3%, whichever is the higher, at the tradesman or equivalent level and above;

(ii) a second increase of the same order as in (i) above to be paid not less than 6 months after the first increase;

(iii) the first increase will be accessible from 30 October 1989 but the actual date of operation for an award will be the date on which that award is varied in accordance with the State Wage Case decision of 30 October 1989; and

(iv) the second increase will not be automatic, but subject to application.

2.       Minimum Rates Adjustment

Minimum rates adjustments allowable in the State Wage Case decision of 30 October 1989 shall be in accordance with the following:

(i) the appropriate adjustments in any award will be applied in not less than 4 instalments which will become payable at 6 monthly intervals;

(ii) in appropriate cases longer phasing-in arrangements may be approved or awarded and/or parties may agree that part of a supplementary payment should be based on service;

(iii) the first instalment of these adjustments will not be available in any award prior to 1 January 1990 or 3 months after the variation of the particular award to implement the first stage structural efficiency adjustment, whichever is the later;

(iv) the second and subsequent instalments of these adjustments will not be automatic and applications to vary the relevant awards will be necessary; and

(v) acceptance of absorption of these adjustments to the extent of equivalent overaward payments is a prerequisite to their being applied in any award.

3.      Special Cases

Any claim for increases in wages and salaries or improvements in conditions which exceed the maximum increases allowable under the State Wage Case decision of 30 October 1989 will be processed as a special case before a Full Bench of the Commission or through the anomalies and inequities principle at the discretion of the President. Such cases should be considered in accordance with the structural efficiency and other relevant principles.

STRUCTURAL EFFICIENCY

Structural efficiency adjustments allowable under the State Wage Case decision of 30 October 1989 will be justified in accordance with this principle if the Commission is satisfied that the parties to an award have co-operated positively in a fundamental review of that award and are implementing measures to improve the efficiency of industry and provide workers with access to more varied, fulfilling and better paid jobs. The measures to be considered should include but not be limited to:

• establishing skill-related career paths which provide an incentive for workers to continue to participate in skill formation;

• eliminating impediments to multi-skilling and broadening the range of tasks which a worker may be required to perform;

• creating appropriate relativities between different categories of workers within the award and at enterprise level;

• ensuring that working patterns and arrangements enhance flexibility and the efficiency of the industry;

• including properly fixed minimum rates for classifications in awards, related appropriately to one another, with any amounts in excess of these properly fixed minimum rates being expressed as supplementary payments;

• updating and/or rationalising the list of persons and parties to awards; and

• addressing any cases where award provisions discriminate against sections of the workforce.

Structural efficiency exercises should incorporate all past work value considerations.

WORK VALUE CHANGES

(a) Changes in work value may arise from changes in the nature of the work, skill and responsibility required or the conditions under which work is performed. Changes in work by themselves may not lead to a change in wage rates. The strict test for an alteration in wage rates is that the change in the nature of the work should constitute such a significant net addition to work requirements as to warrant the creation of a new classification.

These are the only circumstances in which rates may be altered on the ground of work value and the altered rates may be applied only to employees whose work has changed in accordance with this principle.

However, rather than create a new classification it may be more appropriate in the circumstances of a particular case to fix a new rate for an existing classification or to provide for an allowance which is payable in addition to the existing rate for the classification. In such cases the same strict test must be applied.

(b) Where new or changed work justifying the higher rate is performed only from time to time by persons covered by a particular classification or where it is performed only by some of the persons covered by the classification, such new or changed work should be compensated by a special allowance which is payable only when the new or changed work is performed by a particular employee and not by increasing the rate for the classification as a whole.

(c) The time from which work value changes should be measured is the last work value adjustment in the award under consideration but in no case earlier than 1 January 1978. Care should be exercised to ensure that changes which were taken into account in any previous work value adjustments or in a structural efficiency exercise are not included in any work evaluation under this principle.

(d) Where a significant net alteration to work value has been established in accordance with this principle, an assessment will have to be made as to how that alteration should be measured in money terms. Such assessment should normally be based on the previous work requirements, the wage previously fixed for the work and the nature and extent of the change in work. However, where appropriate, comparisons may also be made with other wages and work requirements within the award or to wage increases for changed work requirements in the same classification in other awards provided the same changes have occurred.

(e) The expression "the conditions under which the work is performed" relates to the environment in which the work is done.

(f) The Commission should guard against contrived classifications and over-classification of jobs;

(g) Any changes in the nature of the work, skill and responsibility required or the conditions under which the work is performed, taken into account in assessing an increase under any other principle, shall not be taken into account in any claim under this principle.

ALLOWANCES

(a)     Existing Allowances

(i) Existing allowances which constitute a reimbursement of expenses incurred may be adjusted from time to time where appropriate to reflect the relevant change in the level of such expenses.

(ii) Existing allowances which relate to work or conditions which have not changed may be adjusted from time to time to reflect State wage increases, except where a flat money amount has been awarded, provided that shift allowances expressed in awards as money amounts may be adjusted for flat money amount State wage increases.

(iii) Existing allowances for which an increase is claimed because of changes in the work or conditions will be determined in accordance with the relevant provisions of the work value changes principle.

(b)     New Allowances

(i) New allowances to compensate for the reimbursement of expenses incurred may be awarded where appropriate having regard to such expenses.

(ii) No other new allowances shall be created unless changes in work have occurred or new work or conditions have arisen: where changes have occurred or new work and conditions have arisen, the question of a new allowance, if any, shall be determined in accordance with the relevant principle.

The relevant principle in this context may be work value changes or first awards and extensions to existing awards principle.

(c)     Service Increments

(i) Existing service increments may be adjusted in the manner prescribed in (a)(ii) of this principle.

(ii) New service increments may only be allowed to compensate for changes in the work and/or conditions and will be determined in accordance with the relevant provisions of the work value changes principle.

SUPERANNUATION

(a) Agreements may be certified or consent awards made providing for employer contributions to approved superannuation schemes for employees covered by such agreements or consent awards provided those agreements or consent awards:

(i) operate from a date determined or approved by the Commission; and

(ii) do not involve the equivalent of a wage increase in excess of 3% of ordinary time earnings of employees.

(b) Where, following a claim for employer contributions to approved superannuation schemes for employees, the parties are unable to negotiate an agreement consistent with this principle, and conciliation proceedings before the Commission have also failed to achieve such an agreement, the Commission shall, subject to the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1984, arbitrate on that claim.

(c) Subject to the Industrial Relations Act 1984, the Commission will not grant retrospective operation for any matters determined in accordance with this principle.

(d) For the purposes of this principle, approved superannuation scheme means a scheme approved in accordance with the Commonwealth Operational Standards for Occupational Superannuation Funds.

STANDARD HOURS

(a) In dealing with claims for a reduction in standard hours to 38 per week, the cost impact of the shorter week should be minimised. Accordingly, the Commission should satisfy itself that as much as possible of the required cost offset is achieved by changes in work practices.

(b) Claims for reduction in standard weekly hours below 38, even will full cost offsets, will not be allowed.

(c) Changes in work practices designed to minimise the cost of introducing shorter hours will not be a consideration for claims under any other principle.

CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT

Except for the flow-on of test case provisions, applications for changes in conditions other than those provided elsewhere in the principles will be considered in the light of their cost implications both directly and through flow-on.

ANOMALIES AND INEQUITIES

(a)    Anomalies

(i) In the resolution of anomalies, the overriding concept is that the Commission must be satisfied that any claim under this principle will not be a vehicle for general improvements in pay and conditions and that the circumstances warranting the improvement are of a special and isolated nature.

(ii) Decisions which are inconsistent with the principles of the Commission applicable at the relevant time should not be followed.

(iii) The doctrines of comparative wage justice and maintenance of relativities should not be relied upon to establish an anomaly because there is nothing rare or special in such situations and because resort to these concepts would destroy the overriding concept of this principle.

(b)    Inequities

(i) The resolution of inequities existing where employees performing similar work are paid dissimilar rates of pay without good reason, shall be processed through the Anomalies Conference and not otherwise, and shall be subject to all the following conditions:

(1) the work in issue is similar to the other class or classes of work by reference to the nature of the work, the level of skill and responsibility involved and the conditions under which the work is performed;

(2) the classes of work being compared are truly like with like as to all relevant matters and there is no good reason for dissimilar rates of pay;

(3) in addition to similarity of work, there exists some other significant factor which makes the situation inequitable. An historical or geographical nexus between the similar classes of work may not of itself be such a factor;

(4) the rate of pay fixed for the class or classes of work being compared with the work in issue is a reasonable and proper rate of pay for the work and is not vitiated by any reason such as an increase obtained for reasons inconsistent with the principles of the Commission applicable at the relevant time;

(5) rates of pay in minimum rates awards are not to be compared with those in paid rates awards.

(ii) In dealing with inequities, the following overriding considerations shall apply:

(1) the pay increase sought must be justified on the merits;

(2) there must be no likelihood of flow-on;

(3) the economic cost must be negligible;

(4) the increase must be a once-only matter.

(c)    Procedure

(i) An anomaly or inequity which is sought to be rectified must be brought to the Anomalies Conference by the peak union council, namely the TTLC.

(ii) The matter is first discussed with the employers and other interested parties at the Conference.

(iii) The broad principles for processing the anomaly or inequity raised are:

(1) if there is complete agreement as to the existence of an anomaly or inequity and its resolution, and the President is of the opinion that there is a genuine anomaly or inequity, the President will make the appropriate order to rectify it.

(2) if there is no agreement at all, one of the two situations can arise. Either the President will hold that there is no anomaly or inequity falling within the concept of the Conference which would mean an end of the matter as far as the Conference is concerned, or on the other hand the President could hold that there was an arguable case which would then go to a single Commissioner or Full Bench of the Commission for consideration.

(3) this procedure can be departed from by agreement and with the President's approval.

PAID RATES AWARDS

(a) Except in special cases, the Commission will not make new paid rates awards.

(b) In the making of a first paid rates award the conditions as provided in the first awards and extensions to existing awards principle must be complied with.

(c) Rates in paid rates awards should not be fixed at a level which would affect the rates for other workers.

(d) In assessing an adjustment in rates of pay in a paid rates award it is inappropriate to apply the General Motors-Holden's Limited and Ford Australia Ltd Case approach of:

"awarding an increase to restore to the rates under the awards the relationship which they had when established vis-à-vis rates actually paid for similar work in industries located near the establishments of these two companies."

(e) Subject to special cases, no special adjustment will be approved for paid rates awards which cannot be justified on the basis of the creation of a proper career structure through structural efficiency.

(f) In paid rates awards no increase at the base rate which is greater than the structural efficiency adjustment will be approved.

(g) The rates of pay prescribed by a new paid rates award must be expressed in terms of properly fixed minimum classification rates plus supplementary payments.

(h) Paid rates awards should contain clear classification definitions.

(i) Statutory declarations will be required from all parties to paid rates award to the effect that the integrity of those awards will be preserved.

(j) If a paid rates award fails to maintain itself as a true paid rates award that award should be discontinued and replaced by a minimum rates award.

FIRST AWARDS AND EXTENSIONS TO EXISTING AWARDS

(a) In the making of a first award, the long established principles shall apply ie prima facie the main consideration is the existing rates and conditions.

(b) in the extension of an existing award to new work or to award-free work the rates applicable to such work will be assessed by reference to the value of work already covered by the award.

(c) In awards regulating the employment of workers previously covered by a Federal award or determination, existing rates and conditions prima facie will be the proper award rates and conditions.

(d) Where a first award is made it shall contain a minimum rate for each classification of employee covered by it. Where the total rate determined for each classification in accordance with (a) and (c) of this principle exceeds the appropriate minimum rate for that classification, the excess amount shall be prescribed as a supplementary payment. For the purposes of this paragraph, the appropriate minimum rate will be assessed by comparison with similar classifications in other minimum rates awards.

ECONOMIC INCAPACITY

Any respondent or group of respondents to an award may apply to reduce and/or postpone the application of any increase in labour costs determined under the principles on the ground of very serious or extreme economic adversity. The merit of such application shall be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of each case and any material relating thereto shall be rigorously tested.

1 P025
2 P047
3 Ibid
4 Ibid
5 Print H9100