T7897
TASMANIAN INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Industrial Relations Act 1984 Albertus Letter and Pioneer Building Products Pty Ltd trading as Nubrik
Industrial dispute - termination of employment - extension of time - not granted - application dismissed REASONS FOR DECISION This was an application for a dispute hearing made under Section 29(1A) of the Industrial Relations Act 1984 (the Act) by Albertus Letter of South Launceston. Mr Letter was in dispute with Pioneer Building Products Pty Ltd trading as Nubrik of Longford (the Company) over the amount of severance pay he received in respect of the termination of his employment with the Company as a result of redundancy (Section 29(1A)(b) of the Act). Mr R Pearce, a legal practitioner, after the Commission dismissed an objection by the Tasmanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Limited (the Chamber) representing the Company, was granted leave to appear on Mr Letter's behalf. The Chamber also opposed the granting of an extension of time to Mr Letter since his application was lodged outside the 14 day time limit prescribed in Section 29(1B) of the Act. Mr Letter came forward as a witness in support of the application for an extension of time and the following evidence was given:
It was submitted on Mr Letter's behalf that an extension of time should be granted in all the circumstances. It was pointed out that the Company had not sought to show that it had been prejudiced by the delay. In opposing an extension of time the Company said that it was not an automatic right and the general principles on the matter, endorsed by the Commission in O'Connor v Capital Hill Corporation1 needed to be taken into account. The Company canvassed the general principles quoted and submitted on that basis that the extension of time should not be granted. On Mr Letter's behalf it was acknowledged in response that the general principles mentioned ought to be applied and, in that context, the Company had conceded that matter of merit could not be determined because all the evidence on that had not been adduced. As to Mr Letter's ignorance of the time limit, it was admitted as irrelevant, but, submitted that it was still a factor. The Commission was also asked to note that Mr Letter was an uncomplicated person in legal matters, he had not experienced this kind of thing before and he did do his best to make enquiries. DECISION I have considered and applied the general principles relied on by both sides in this application, which were originally enunciated by Wilcox J in the case Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen2 and as a result I have decided not to grant an extension of time. There was no acceptable reasonable explanation for the delayed application in this case. Mr Letter knew in April 1998 that his employment would be terminated at the end of June 1998. It would have been reasonable to have lodged a dispute application in April 1998 as Mr Letter had made it known then to the Company that he considered the redundancy payment to be inadequate, but, his application was not lodged till more than 12 weeks after that. Even after his employment ceased Mr Letter took five weeks to lodge his application. Mr Letter certainly expressed to the Company his dissatisfaction with the amount of the redundancy payment at the time he accepted, but, he did not continue to make the Company aware that he was going to contest the matter till over 12 weeks later. The Company agreed there was no prejudice as a result of the delayed application, but, that is not a key element in this determination and I regard it as neutral. Whilst I accept the submission that the merit of Mr Letter's case was not canvassed fully, nonetheless, there was a not insignificant redundancy package accepted by Mr Letter, albeit reluctantly. In these circumstances I am persuaded the substantial merit of the application was not sufficient for me to grant the extension of time. There was no evidence that other employees of the Company had been made redundant or had disputed any redundancy payment so considerations of fairness do not enter into this determination. For all these reasons I reject the application for an extension of time for lodgement: the application is dismissed and I so order.
P A Imlach Appearances: Date and place of hearing: 1 Tasmanian Industrial Commission, T6563 of 1996 |