T12922
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TASMANIAN INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Industrial Relations Act 1984 The Minister administering the State Service Act 2000 and The Community and Public Sector Union (State Public Services
Industrial dispute - changes to roster sought - 12 hour shifts - powers of Commission - public interest - management prerogative - no extra claims - order issued REASONS FOR DECISION [1] On 18 April 2007, the Minister administering the State Service Act 2000 (the applicant), applied to the President, pursuant to s29(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1984 (the Act) for a hearing before a Commissioner in respect of an industrial dispute with the Community and Public Sector Union (State Public Services Federation Tasmania) Inc. (CPSU) and the Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union, Tasmanian Branch (LHMU), (the respondents), arising out of work bans imposed at the Risdon Prison Complex (RPC). [2] A hearing commenced in Hobart on Wednesday 18 April 2007. Mr P Baker, with Messrs Ogle, Barber and McCulloch, appeared for the applicant and Mr P Tullgren, with Ms M Appleton and Mr R Armstrong, appeared for the LHMU. Mr N Shepherd, with Messrs B Sutton and R O'Hiere, appeared for the CPSU. [3] The disputes that gave rise to the bans concerned the lack of presence of a Tactical Response Group (TRG) on site at the RPC and the refusal of the employer to agree to a trial of 12 hour day shifts at the complex. The LHMU and CPSU had advised that their members would not return to work until their demands were met in relation to the reintroduction of a full-time TRG presence and until the Department of Justice (the department) agreed to a trial of 12 hour shifts, or until ordered to return to work by the Commission. [4] The parties entered into discussions with the assistance of the Commission which resulted in recommendations being made that all bans be lifted immediately, that the TRG be reinstated and that discussions continue, with a report back to the Commission on 30 April 2007. No agreements were reached in respect of the 12 hour shifts issue. [5] The hearing resumed on 30 April 2007. The parties reported that they were still in dispute in relation to the 12 hour shifts and that aspect of the dispute notification would need to be arbitrated. Meetings were continuing between the parties in respect of the TRG issue. I determined that if the dispute relating to the TRG remained unresolved then it should be dealt with as part of Matter T12902, a dispute previously notified which related to the same issue. The 12 hour shift issue would remain as part of this matter. There was a further, unsuccessful, attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation. [6] The matter was heard on 30 and 31 May 2007. Mr P Turner sought and was granted leave to appear for the applicant. It was recorded that Mr Tullgren was appearing on behalf of both unions. BACKGROUND [7] The respondent unions are seeking an order that 12 hour shifts be trialled for a total of six months - three months in the maximum security and three months in the minimum security sections at the RPC. They claim that there was an expectation on the part of correctional officers that 12 hour shifts would be introduced upon the completion of the new prison complex. Currently, there is a shift rotation that involves eight, 10 and 12 hour shifts. [8] The department has not agreed to the trial, claiming that 12 hour shifts do not suit the operational requirements of the facility and that it would be costly to conduct the trial. The unions argue that it is not possible to know whether 12 hour shifts would operate successfully without a trial and a cost benefit analysis of such arrangements. [9] The Commission was told that 12 hour shifts have been implemented in Launceston, at the Hobart Remand Centre, the Hayes Prison Farm, in some circumstances at the RPC, and in some parts of the old Risdon Prison. [10] There had been a number of meetings of a consultative group chaired by Mr Ogle at which a trial of 12 hour shifts and their possible implementation had been discussed. On 17 April 2007 representatives of the department advised their unwillingness to continue negotiations regarding the trial. [11] The unions are seeking an order of the Commission as follows:
SUBMISSIONS Mr Tullgren for the respondent unions [12] Mr Tullgren submitted that the Act gives the Commission an expansive disputes settling role. An industrial dispute is defined in s3 to mean "a dispute in relation to an industrial matter", which is "any matter pertaining to the relations of employers and employees". The definition should not be construed too narrowly. The present dispute concerning the length of shifts and hours of work is an industrial matter pertaining to the relations of employees and employers. [13] Mr Tullgren said that the rostering of employees goes to the mode, terms and conditions of employment. Authority for that is found in a decision of the High Court Re Cram: ex parte NSW Colliery Proprietors Association Ltd (1987) 61 ALJR 401 (Cram), which dealt with "manning" issues. The High Court determined that the definition of "mode, terms and conditions of employment" is wide enough to encompass the issue of rostering. [14] The Full Bench of the Supreme Court of Tasmania considered the jurisdiction and powers of the Commission in Blue Ribbon Products Pty Ltd v Tasmanian Industrial Commission (2004) TASSC 142 (Blue Ribbon). [15] In the unions' submission, the Commission is able to deal with this matter because it is an industrial matter and is not excluded by subparagraph (i) of the definition of "industrial matter" [relating to appointments and promotions]. That question has already been determined in Australian Nursing Federation (Tasmanian Branch and the Minister Administering the State Service Act T12788 of 2006 (ANF). The Commission found that it had the jurisdiction to deal with staffing and rostering levels and the powers to make orders. Mr Tullgren said that the observations in that case equally apply in the instant case; the decision was not appealed and the reasoning stands. [16] Section 20 requires the Commission to act according to equity, good conscience and the merits of the case, which establishes an overarching doctrine of fairness, subject to the duty to determine a case according to the law. The order that is sought does not require the Commission to depart from applying the general law about its powers and is the only thing that would settle the dispute. It is the only sensible way of informing the debate and the dispute about whether 12 hour shifts should be introduced; a trial and the gathering and assessment of evidence would be fair and equitable as it would expose both sides to the same risk. [17] Mr Tullgren submitted that it is in the public interest that the dispute be dealt with - disputation will not go away simply because there is a wish that it disappear. Mr Tullgren referred to a number of authorities going to the question of the public interest; he said it would be in the public interest for the Commission to issue the order because it would be helpful in the attainment of industrial peace and better employer and employee relations. [18] The unions contended that the current system enabled management to visit injustice or unfairness upon employees through the mixed roster system where the employer picks and chooses who works 12 hour shifts, who works 10 hours and who works eight hours, whereas, he said, in the other prisons in the state everybody works 12 hour shifts. [19] The Custodial Officers Award (the award) and the Correctional Officers Agreement 2005 (the agreement) govern the employees' hours of work. Mr Tullgren said that the award provides that the daily hours shall not exceed eight hours unless otherwise agreed between the employer and a majority of the employees. Currently, there is a mix of eight, 10 and 12 hour shifts across the various facilities by agreement between the parties. [20] When it was decided that a new prison complex would be built, the department made it clear to staff that the new prison would operate with a greater use of 12 hour structured days. In support of this Mr Tullgren tendered two documents - Summary Of Proposed Changes To Roster Design Principles and Risdon Prison Complex Structured Day (Weekdays)1. Mr Tullgren said the documents showed that it was the intention that the prison would operate as a 12 hour shift prison. The department then changed its mind and introduced a mixture of shifts. Mr Tullgren submitted that the correctional officers had a legitimate expectation that they would be working 12 hour shifts. [21] Mr Tullgren contended that the current allocation of 12 hour shifts is arbitrary and not based on any logical foundation. The proposal for a 12 hour shifts trial would, hopefully, remove the arbitrary element from the roster lengths. He said that the employer's decision directly affected the hours of work of individual correctional officers, which is an important part of the mode, terms and conditions of employment. The failure to introduce such shifts is unjust and unfair to the correctional officers. Mr Tullgren said that the reason for the difference between 10 hour shifts and 12 hour shifts [currently worked] was principally that 12 hour shifts are night shifts. [22] Mr Tullgren told the Commission that there are 21 correctional officers employed in medium security; seven work 10 hour shifts and two work 12 hour shifts. In maximum security there are 42 officers, working in two teams of 21 officers. In the first team, on any one day, six officers work 10 hour shifts and two work 12 hour shifts. In the second team six officers work 10 hour shifts, two work 12 hour shifts and two work 8 hour shifts. This demonstrates that the ordinary hours of work already include 10 and 12 hour shifts therefore what the union is seeking is not different to hours already worked. Clauses 15 and 18 of the award provide that the ordinary hours of work will be eight unless otherwise agreed between the employer and the majority of employees. The order sought is not seeking to impose hours that do not currently exist, but simply to rearrange the configuration, at least on a trial basis. The proposal is not contrary to award or agreement provisions. [23] In relation to the question of management prerogative, Mr Tullgren said that the present matter fell within what had traditionally been regarded as an area of management prerogative. The approach adopted has been to consider whether or not the decision by management has created unfairness or injustice or is the cause of an industrial dispute and needs to be addressed. The Commission should reject any proposition that management can reserve to itself prerogative over matters affecting employees in such a way that the wider jurisdiction of the Commission is ousted. Where a matter has a significant and direct impact on the working conditions of employees the notion of management prerogative should be rejected. There is authority that the Commission has jurisdiction to deal with matters regarded as management prerogative, to be determined on their merits. The High Court dealt with this in Cram, which is the leading authority. The current dispute is about the hours of work of employees. The High Court found that the notion of management prerogatives solely dictating terms and conditions of work is outmoded and without legal foundation. The ordering of the trial sought does not adversely or excessively affect the exercise of any management rights. [24] It is beyond doubt that there is an industrial dispute requiring arbitration; the solution proposed by the union is relevant, appropriate and within the jurisdiction of the Commission. The trial sought would assess the merits of 12 hour shifts and would provide opportunities to consider such issues as health and safety, staffing levels, shiftwork patterns and financial aspects. The approach advocated by the unions is a cost benefit analysis that will assist in determining whether the introduction of 12 hour shifts is an appropriate and effective allocation of resources. [25] Mr Tullgren referred extensively to a paper entitled Benefit Analysis of Supermax Prisons - Critical Steps and Considerations2. He said that the document provided examples of the practical application of a cost benefit analysis and its use as an analytical tool. It gave a framework for the steps that the unions believe should apply in determining the issue of 12 hour shifts. The unions were asking the Commission to order such an analysis, as set out in the draft order provided. [26] Mr Tullgren submitted that the Commission would not be in breach of the Act if the order sought were issued; it would not be making an award or varying or creating a provision of an award. The rosters currently worked can be in excess of 38 hours a week, as demonstrated in Exhibit A2. In relation to the old Risdon Prison, there is currently an agreement for different length shifts to be worked, as contemplated in clauses 15 and 18 of the award and as a result of a ballot conducted in 2005. This has effectively been carried over to the new prison. [27] What is being sought is not a new claim; 12 hour shifts already exist. It cannot therefore be considered to be in breach of the "no extra claims" clause in the agreement. It is not a claim for new hours; it is simply a claim for a trial so that assumptions can be tested. There are no studies in relation to prisons and 12 hour shifts. The department's claim that the current method of working is efficient and effective is put without basis. Mr Turner for the Applicant [28] Mr Turner presented a written submission3 which included an outline of the history of the application and the dispute. Under the heading Summary of Application he said:
[29] Mr Turner submitted that the provisions of the award at clauses 15 and 18 and of the agreement are such that, absent agreement by the parties, the Commission has no power to vary the agreement so as to make provision for the shifts as sought by the unions, or, under a s29 application, to vary the terms of the award. The only way in which the award may be varied is by application to a Full Bench under the provisions of Division 3 of Part 2 of the Act. [30] The 12 hour shifts issue is properly characterised as an industrial matter, but by making the claim the respondents are breaching Clause 7 [no extra claims] of the agreement. The proposal is a new claim concerning conditions of employment. [31] In oral submissions, Mr Turner said that he was not seeking to persuade the Commission that there was no industrial dispute, but he was contending that the Commission did not have the power to make the orders sought because of the provisions of s31(2) and s59 of the Act. The respondent was seeking to alter ordinary hours of work to that which currently applied. [32] The default provision of the award is that ordinary hours of work shall not exceed eight, unless otherwise agreed, and what is being sought is something beyond eight hours. The Commission does not have the power to force people to agree. [33] Section 31(1) does give the Commission wide powers in settling a dispute, however s31(2)(b) specifically provides that the Commission may not make an order [in settlement of a dispute] which makes or varies the provisions of an award. What is sought would have the effect of varying clause 15 of the award. The powers are wide, but s31(1A) and (1B) limits the power. If the dispute is about an award then s31(1) gives the Commission the power to order that an application [to vary the award] be made under s23 or [for an interpretation] of the award under s43. [34] Mr Turner submitted that s60 of the Act provides that an industrial agreement takes precedence over an award and what is being sought in the draft order might be construed as being a variation to an agreement. [In this case] it is the award that sets the hours and the agreement has little to say on the matter. Section 59 deals with variations to agreements and does not allow for a unilateral variation absent agreement by the parties. [35] Mr Turner said that if the Commission was against him on the argument that there was no power to make the order, then, he submitted, the Commission ought not to make the orders sought unless positively persuaded that it was appropriate to do so. As said by Mr Tullgren, there is no empirical evidence to show that what is sought is demonstrably in anyone's best interests. [36] In Mr Turner's submission, clause 7 of the agreement provides that no party will pursue any extra claims during the life of the agreement with respect to salaries and conditions. The default provision of eight ordinary hours applies unless by agreement and plainly there is no agreement for what is being sought. Hence, there is a new claim in relation to conditions of employment, that is, a different rostering arrangement by which 12 hour shifts would be worked on a different basis to the way in which 12 hour shifts are currently worked and for which there is currently agreement. If the order sought were granted it would be rewarding the respondent for breaching clause 7 of the agreement. Mr Baker for the Applicant [37] Mr Baker said that in 2005 the parties had discussions about the hours of work, resulting in a ballot being conducted by the Australian Electoral Commission. Two propositions regarding rosters were put to the employees who were at what is now known as the Risdon Prison Complex. Both proposals incorporated the working of eight, 10 and 12 hours shifts. Following the ballot the preferred roster was put in place and has continued since then. [38] Mr Baker told the Commission that officers are not arbitrarily allocated hours, they are placed on a rostered cycle and each officer works the various shifts - whether eight, 10 or 12 hours. All officers have the opportunity to work the three rosters. That is demonstrated in the document Correctional Officers Roster4. [39] In Mr Baker's submission, the Commission should not intervene unless it can be demonstrated that there has been an error in the process or if it was grossly unfair. He referred to a number of decisions going to management prerogative, onus, and extra claims. [40] Mr Baker submitted that the current hours of work are the most effective and efficient manner of operation. The present system enables the requirements of the prison industries, such as the workshops and the laundries, to be met. There had already been a trial of 12 hour shifts in a part of the old Risdon Prison which was unsuccessful and resulted in no additional time for the prisoners' activities. Anecdotally, he said, the longer the shift, the more sick leave there was. As the day is currently structured, industry supervisors, psychologists, other health staff and clerical staff are all part of an eight hour day shift regime. [41] The department's costings, as set out in Exhibit A2, show that the cost of the introduction of 12 hour shifts for correctional staff would be a recurrent cost of $1.24 million per annum. Initially, overtime would need to be used because there is no capacity to deploy existing staff. The cost would be $2.5 million when applied right across the RPC, including operations areas as well as the medium and maximum security facilities. The trial [involving only medium and maximum] would be cheaper but would still involve overtime. [42] Mr Baker submitted that it is well recognised that there are concerns with the impact of 12 hour shifts. The only prison that he is aware of in Australia that works 12 hour shifts is in West Australia. In 2005 there was a report on those 12 hour shift arrangements - Review of Management of Offenders in Custody.5 Mr Baker quoted extensively from the negative findings in the report, including poor staff relationships with prisoners, employee fatigue, stress, safety problems and employees' difficulties in achieving a work/family balance. [43] Mr Baker also referred to a decision concerning Victorian police officers on 12 hour shifts and the evidence that was presented during that case by Victoria Police which showed that officers on 12 hour shifts had higher levels of Workcover claims, unplanned leave claims and accidents.6 [44] Mr Baker proposed that, as an alternative to the order sought, there be a study into the effects of shiftwork arrangements on Tasmanian correctional officers which would include: effects on health and wellbeing, family life and work balance, unplanned absences and efficiency and effectiveness. The study would consider the short and long term effects of the current working hours arrangements on its correctional officers. An independent person agreed between the parties [to the dispute] would conduct the study. The unions would be consulted and involved in oversighting the study, with a meeting between them to discuss how that should be managed. The results would provide a basis for moving forward on the issue of shift work. An outline of the proposed study was provided to the Commission.7 [45] The applicant contended that it would be inappropriate for the Commission to intervene in the rostering system given that the current roster system was put in place by agreement between management and the employees FINDINGS [46] The respondents are seeking an order that changes be made to the roster for correctional officers employed to work at the Risdon Prison Complex. The dispute is a dispute about hours of work. Mr Turner for the applicant said: "I don't for a moment seek to persuade you that there is no industrial dispute..."8. The parties are agreed on that point. I find that there is an industrial dispute concerning the mode, terms and conditions of employment. In support of that I rely on Cram, in which the High Court dealt with "manning" issues and found a dispute about "manning" levels to be "a good example" of an issue affecting the mode, terms and conditions of employment and therefore an "industrial matter".
[47] In my view, the remarks apply equally to work rosters including such issues as the length of a shift. [48] The applicant submitted that the Commission is without powers to make the order sought, arguing that the respondent unions are seeking to alter the ordinary hours of work contrary to the provisions of the Custodial Officers Award. The "default position" in the award, in the absence of agreement between the parties regarding extended hours, is that the ordinary hours of work are eight hours per day. What is sought would, the applicant argued, have the effect of varying clause 15 - Ordinary Hours of Work - of the award. [49] Section 31(1) of the Act confers broad powers on the Commission for the purpose of settling industrial disputes, which are limited only by s31(2):
[50] Unless a Commissioner specifically orders that an award be varied then the award is not varied. Section 31(2)(b) cannot, in my opinion, be read to mean anything other than that a Commissioner cannot order that the award itself be varied or an award be made for the purpose of settling a dispute made under s29. If the order sought in this case were to be granted it would not be in breach of s31(2)(b) because it would not be an order that the award be varied. [51] A Commissioner may, as provided for in 31(3) make an order requiring a party to make an application to vary an award or for an interpretation of an award. I agree with Mr Turner's submission that the award cannot be varied by an order made as a result of an application made under s29. It can only be varied as a result of an application made under s23. Granting the order sought would not change the award. An order made in settlement of a dispute about the application of an award provision is not an order making or varying an award provision. [52] I am of the view that the Commissioner does have the power to make the order sought (which is different to whether, on the merits, it should be made). The respondent referred to the Blue Ribbon case and to the ANF case in which the Commission as currently constituted said at paragraph 67:
In Blue Ribbon Crawford J said in the lead decision at paragraph 33:
[53] It is clear from the decided cases that the Commission has broad powers to make orders to settle disputes, subject to the limitations imposed by s31(2). Were I of the view that, on its merits, the order sought was appropriate and would settle the dispute, then I would order it. For the reasons that follow, I do not think it appropriate. [54] The applicant contended that by bringing the claim the respondents are in breach of the no extra claims provision in the agreement and that if the Commission were to grant the order as sought then they would be rewarded for that breach. I reject the proposition that it would be in breach of the no extra claims provision. [55] Clause 7 of the agreement reads:
[56] "Extra claims" cannot be read to mean "no claims" as it seems is being argued. It is, in my opinion, wrong to suggest that a dispute about existing conditions or a dispute about the application of an existing award or agreement provision is an "extra" claim. The no extra claims provision is a standard provision that is intended to prevent parties, during the life of the agreement, from pursuing additional claims for conditions above those that apply at the time. There is no claim before me seeking to change the existing conditions as set out in the agreement or in the award. [57] The dispute is about the way the work is rostered. The current roster and the proposed roster are both able to be worked under the terms of the award and the agreement. The award establishes that ordinary hours in excess of eight per day can be worked by agreement "between the employer and the majority of employees directly affected by any proposed change". In the absence of such agreement then the "default" position is eight hours per day. [58] Clause 15 of the award provides: 15. ORDINARY HOURS OF WORK
[59] Clause 18 provides: 18. SHIFTWORK
..." (my emphasis) [60] The evidence shows that there is agreement between the employer and the employees that hours in excess of eight per day may be worked. The Tasmanian Electoral Office conducted a ballot in 2005,10 the result of which was that a majority of employees approved an extended shift roster at the RPC. Ten and 12 hour shifts are already in place at the RPC. It is indisputable that the parties to the dispute have agreed that ordinary hours in excess of eight hours per day can be worked. The dispute is not about, as it has been characterised, the introduction of 12 hour shifts - they already exist. It is about extending 12 hour shifts so that they are worked during the day as well as at night. The step provided for in the award has already been taken - there is an agreement between the parties that shifts beyond eight hours per day may be worked. There are already shifts of 10 and 12 hours per day in place. The dispute is about increasing the number of 12 hour shifts worked at the RPC. [61] Having already determined that the Commission does have the power to grant the order sought and that such an order would not be in breach of the no extra claims provision in the agreement, nor would it be in breach of the award or the agreement, the only question remaining to be determined is whether it is appropriate for the Commission to order that a trial of 12 hour day shifts take place, as sought by the unions. Considerations include the notions of managerial prerogative and the public interest. [62] I have read and considered the authorities referred to by the parties. I have referred above to Cram, in which the High Court said that issues directly affecting the relationship of employees and employers are industrial matters and are not the sole prerogative of management. [63] I have taken account of the arguments advanced by Mr Baker in relation to management prerogative, and agree with the principles advanced; in summary, that, prima facie, management has the right to manage their business and that industrial tribunals should not interfere unless that interference is necessary to protect the interests, including the health and safety, of employees. The unions argued that the Commission's role includes providing protection to employees where there is unfairness or injustice as the result of management decisions. I agree with that proposition, but the respondent unions have failed to establish that there is any unfairness or injustice in this case. The rostering system is not arbitrary, or imposed in any way that visits unfairness upon any one employee compared to another. The evidence at Exhibit A2 showed that correctional officers employed at the Risdon Prison Complex are placed on a roster that rotates each officer through a cycle comprising various shifts. It is not a case, as claimed by the respondents, where "the employer picks and chooses based purely on their wishes, who works 12 hour shifts..."11 There is no need for an order of the Commission to ensure fairness in the application of the roster. [64] The respondents submitted that the Commission should grant the order they seek because gathering evidence about the cost and benefits of working 12 hour shifts would be a fair and equitable way in which to settle the industrial dispute and would, therefore, be in the public interest and in accordance with the Commission's duty to act with fairness and equity. It was argued that the granting of the order would be an exercise in equity because it would expose both sides to the same risk in relation to what the outcome of a cost benefit analysis might be. That is true as far as it goes, it does expose both parties to the same risk so far as the outcome of the exercise is concerned, but the financial cost to one party would be substantial. In Exhibit 2 the costs to the applicant are set out. Over the six months trial period additional wages, including overtime, are assessed as being $278,000. In addition, the order sought requires all costs, including for the conduct of a cost-benefit analysis, to be borne by the applicant. The financial burden would fall to one party only. That would not necessarily be a consideration if there was an unfairness to be remedied, but, as I have already found, there is not. [65] For the reasons given above, I have decided that it would not be appropriate to order a trial of 12 hour day shifts, as sought by the respondent unions. [66] The unions argued that it would be in the public interest for the Commission to grant the order sought because it would settle the dispute, implying that if the order were not granted then, as far as they were concerned, there would still be a dispute. I agree that it is in the public interest for industrial tribunals to ensure, so far as is possible, industrial peace and an orderly industrial relations system. However, that does not mean giving a party to a dispute exactly what it is they are seeking. Usually at least one party in an arbitrated dispute is left with an outcome they are not happy with. However, the dispute itself is settled by the issuing of the order. If a claim is rejected then there is an expectation, indeed, a requirement, that the parties to the dispute will accept the outcome and comply with any order issued, subject, of course, to any appeal. [67] The dispute arose as the result of an application made by the Minister Administering the State Service Act 2000 regarding work bans imposed by the unions at the Risdon Prison Complex. Mr Tullgren, for the respondent unions, said that this issue is one of great controversy between the parties and, in the interests of industrial harmony, the Commission should order the trial so that the parties would be better informed of the advantages, or otherwise, of 12 hour shifts. During the hearing, the department proposed an alternative as a means by which the parties would be better informed. They proposed a study, funded by the applicant, into the effects of shiftwork on Tasmanian correctional officers. The applicant asked the Commission to recommend the study as a means of settling the dispute. The unions have rejected the proposition. I note that it is open to the department to conduct such a study and it is not necessary for the Commission to make a recommendation in order for it to be conducted. Part of the applicant's proposal is that the respondent unions actively co-operate and participate in the study. It is up to the unions themselves to determine their role in such an exercise. I am, however, for the reasons that follow, ordering the unions to participate in a discussion with the department in relation to the proposed study. [68] In my view, such a study would be desirable. I am persuaded by the examples given by Mr Baker in the West Australian prison system and the Victorian Police Service, which suggest that 12 hour shifts in prisons may not be desirable in the interests of prisoner/staff relations, balancing of work and family life, and the general health and safety of employees. I observe that there are already some 12 hour shifts in operation in the prison system and am of the opinion that an examination of their effect and impact on employees would be of considerable value. At the very least, the parties would be better informed when conducting future negotiations around these issues. [69] In settlement of this dispute, I order, pursuant to s31(1) that representatives of the Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union, Tasmanian Branch, the Community and Public Sector Union (State Public Services Federation Tasmania) Inc. and the Minister administering the State Service Act 2000 meet to discuss and consider the proposal for a study into the effects of shift work on correctional officers employed in the Tasmanian prison system, and that such a meeting take place no later than 17 September 2007.
P C Shelley Appearances: Date and place of hearing: 1 Exhibits R5 Summary of Proposed Changes to Roster Design Principles and R6 Risdon Prison Complex Structured Day (Weekdays)
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