T7387
TASMANIAN INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Industrial Relations Act 1984 Mark Meaney and Sacred Heart College
Appeal against order handed down by Deputy President King on 24.11.97 in matter T7125 of 1997 in relation to the termination of Mr Meaney's employment with Sacred Heart College - Appeal dismissed by majority decision - order of Deputy President confirmed REASONS FOR DECISION WESTWOOD P. AND WATLING C. This was an appeal made under Section 70(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1984 (the Act). It was brought against a decision of Deputy President King (the Deputy President) in matter T7125 of 1997 which was an application for a dispute hearing made under section 29(1A) of the Act by Mark Meaney. Mr Meaney had been in dispute with Sacred Heart College, New Town, over the termination of his employment. The Deputy President dismissed the application. 1. Introduction A brief overview of the events described in the Deputy President's decision when dismissing the application is as follows:
The uncontested circumstances leading to the incident, briefly described, were as follows:
The appeal was made on the following grounds: "1. The findings of the Deputy President that the Applicant conducted himself in an unprofessional and unacceptable manner in his dealings with the student was against the evidence and against the weight of the evidence. 2. The evidence was incapable of supporting a finding to the requisite standard that the Applicant had committed an act or acts which constituted misconduct. 3. The Deputy President failed to make any or sufficient findings of fact to support a conclusion that the Applicant conducted himself in an unprofessional and unacceptable manner."1 The Appellant was represented by Mr Wood, the Respondent by Mr Bessell, both representatives being legal practitioners. Each was granted leave to appear. The Respondent, after Mr Wood had presented the Appellant's case, sought leave to present written submissions to which the Appellant later replied, also in writing. 2. Onus Of Proof Mr Wood, relying on three precedent cases, submitted that the onus of proving misconduct lay on the College whereas the Respondent, whilst accepting that onus, contended, on the basis of Section 31(1A) of the Act and the reference therein to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention concerning the Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer, that it was for the Appellant to prove that the termination of his employment was not justified. Subject to the qualification that this Full Bench is hearing an appeal against a decision upholding a termination of employment, we accept that the law on the onus of proof in this matter is to be found in Section 31(1A) of the Act and its reference to Part II of the ILO Convention referred to above, in particular Article 9.2 which states: "In order for the worker not to have to bear alone the burden of proving that the termination was not justified, the methods of implementation referred to in Article 1 of this Convention shall provide for one or the other or both of the following possibilities: (a) the burden of proving the existence of a valid reason for the termination as defined in Article 4 of this Convention shall rest on the employer; (b) the bodies referred to in Article 8 of this Convention shall be empowered to reach a conclusion on the reason for the termination having regard to the evidence provided by the parties and according to procedures provided for by national law and practice." Our assessment of the requirements of that law is that both possibilities mentioned above apply: in other words the burden of proving the existence of a valid reason for the termination rests with the employer, but to enable the Bench to reach a conclusion on the matter we must of course review the evidence provided by both parties. We note also that the employee is not absolved from the responsibility of proving that the termination was not justified. 3. Standard Of Proof Mr Wood submitted that because of the gravity of the allegations, which were effectively of criminal conduct, the standard of proof required in this matter was of a higher standard than the usual civil standard, being the balance of probabilities. He relied on the High Court case Briginshaw v. Briginshaw2 to say that, even though the balance of probabilities was the standard, that standard would be raised when regard was had for the nature of the allegations and their ramifications. Mr Wood contended Mr Meaney had not been given the benefit of the doubt when he should have been in circumstances where the evidence was basically the word of one person against another and the evidence of the only other eye witness was disregarded. Mr Bessell also referred to Briginshaw and submitted that there were only two standards of proof, the civil standard (the balance of probabilities) and the criminal standard (beyond reasonable doubt) and that the standard of proof in this matter was simply the balance of probabilities. Mr Bessell also relied on the High Court case Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd3in support of his position that in civil litigation in this country the ordinary standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities whether the matter involves criminal conduct or fraud. On the basis of the presumption of innocence Mr Wood further contended that Mr Meaney should only be found guilty of misconduct if the Commission was "morally certain" that the circumstances excluded every hypothesis except that of guilt. In rebutting this submission on the grounds that such reasoning was only available in a criminal case, Mr Bessell relied on a number of references in particular quoting from:
and
Having considered these submissions we are satisfied that the standard of proof in this matter ought to be the balance of probabilities and we adopt the findings set out in Briginshaw as submitted to us by the Respondent6:
4. Evidentiary Summaries (a) The evidence of Mr Meaney and Ms A
(b) The evidence of the only independent eye witness Mr Wood submitted that the Deputy President failed to give sufficient weight to the evidence of the only independent eye witness, a student identified as Mr E, and that evidence was in favour of Mr Meaney. It was submitted that the incident of touching observed by Mr E and recorded in the Deputy President's decision at page 11, must have been the incident of touching described by Mr Meaney in his evidence. Although there was some dispute about the length of the time the touching he said he saw occurred, Mr E gave evidence that it was the first occasion that Mr Meaney had been in that corner of the classroom in the course of the lesson and the first occasion that Mr Meaney had been alongside the student. Mr Wood also submitted that the Deputy President failed to recognise the significance of the evidence of Mr E regarding Mr Meaney speaking to another student in the first half of that double lesson. It was submitted that the evidence was that Mr Meaney went to that student first, then he went to Ms A, on her left hand side, he knelt down and put his "hands" on her left knee, and then said "well done", or words like that, tapped her on the kneecap, stood up and walked off, after which Ms A got up and went to the printer. The Appellant argued that the incident seen by Mr E must have been the incident about which Ms A had complained. It was submitted the incident seen by Mr E was preceded by a fact and followed by a fact completely consistent with the evidence of Mr Meaney. Mr Wood submitted there was no possibility of collusion; the evidence was that Mr Meaney was not allowed to speak to the students and it was submitted that Mr Meaney had not spoken to Mr E. The Appellant further submitted that as it was not disputed that Mr E had seen Mr Meaney touch the student's knee, her evidence that "No one saw anything" because her legs were totally under the desk and out of sight, therefore was not reasonable. Mr Bessell responded that the best evidence of the time of the incident that Mr E alleges he saw was "around about three". As lesson 7 commenced at 2.05 p.m. and finished at 2.45 p.m. and the initial touching Ms A complained of occurred early in lesson 7, it was submitted that Mr E's evidence refers to the second incident. It was submitted that the fact the Deputy President did not mention the evidence concerning the other student did not mean that the Deputy President failed to give it any consideration. Mr Bessell said that it was for the Deputy President to assess what weight the evidence of Mr E should be given in the light of all the other credible evidence. He said the Deputy President obviously considered the evidence because he found it helpful, particularly in respect to the issue as to whether there was a vacant position and whether or not there was a chair next to Ms A. It was submitted that the Deputy President decided the evidence was not conclusive and that such a finding was clearly open and therefore there was no basis for the appeal bench to interfere with it. It seems likely that the incident that Mr E saw and described in his evidence was the "first" (if there was more than one) incident referred to by Ms A. Some of the events recounted by Mr E which preceded the incident, and which followed it, fit and coincide with timing and facts described by Ms A and Mr Meaney. However some of the evidence of Mr E does not fit comfortably with some of Mr Meaney's evidence, such as the length of time Mr Meaney was with Ms A and how long it was after Mr Meaney crouched beside her that he touched or patted her on the knee. In the circumstances we can understand the Deputy President's decision not to rely on some parts of Mr E's evidence and we agree with the Respondent that it was for the Deputy President to assess what weight he should give to the evidence of Mr E. 5. Evidentiary Issues (a) The Evidence of Student, Ms B It was submitted that the Deputy President failed to give any weight to the statement of Ms B who sat nearest to Ms A (Exhibit W.4). Mr Wood submitted that the statement, which was taken by Sister Brady, confirmed that Ms B did not "notice anything strange" and would have noticed if something had bothered Ms A as she knew her well. The Respondent submitted that Ms B did not give evidence (she was not called by the College); therefore the exhibit had little, if any, evidentiary weight. It was further submitted that it would have been wrong for the Deputy President to have relied upon it in any material respect. The Respondent contended that what little weight it had went to confirm that Sister Brady conducted "further and appropriate" enquiries at the Appellant's request. We agree with the Respondent that the Deputy President was not in error in respect of the weight he attached to the statement of Ms B. (b) The Attitude of Mr John Kenny We address the Appellant's submissions under the following headings: Mr Kenny's attitude before the meeting Mr Wood contended that the attitude of Mr Kenny at the meeting with Mr Meaney at 10.15 am. on 8 July 1997, rather than being critical, was of no weight and incapable of supporting any inference of guilt on the part of Mr Meaney. Mr Kenny's "attitude", it was said, was hardly exactness of proof and was irrelevant. Mr Wood submitted the Deputy President erred in giving it weight because, although it came from an experienced educationalist, its probative value was "next to nought". He submitted that evidence of Mr Kenny's attitude ought not to have been admitted and he said there was no explanation in Mr Kenny's evidence as to why he formed the view that there was substance to the allegations. The Respondent rejected the proposition that the Deputy President placed critical importance on the change of attitude of Mr Kenny as a result of what the Appellant said at the meeting. The Respondent said Mr Kenny's attitude was particularly relevant as to whether Mr Meaney, prior to submitting his written response to the allegations, said that his touching of the student was of the nature of a congratulatory pat or that his conduct had been "innocent". Mr Bessell submitted that Mr Kenny's attitude prior to the first interview was that he hoped the complaint had no substance, but, at the first interview, after being made aware of the allegations of the student, Mr Meaney's response indicated to him that there was quite clearly substance to them. The Respondent contended that the relevance of Mr Kenny's "attitude" was that, had anything been said by Mr Meaney at the first interview, or later, to suggest that the touching was innocent, then Mr Kenny clearly would have remembered it and would have seized upon it to support his friend and colleague. We agree with the Appellant that the attitude of Mr Kenny before the meeting has no probative value. Mr Kenny's evidence on the demeanour of Mr Meaney The Deputy President, Mr Wood submitted, placed significance on Mr Kenny's evidence that Mr Meaney, in the course of the first interview, was low key, subdued and not aggressive, however, the Deputy President failed to balance that with Mr Kenny's evidence in relation to Mr Meaney's usual demeanour. Mr Wood submitted that Mr Kenny, when giving evidence, was not asked to comment on Mr Meaney's demeanour during the interview, compared to his usual demeanour. His evidence under cross examination was that it came as no surprise to him that Mr Meaney was not aggressive.9 It was submitted by the Respondent that Mr Kenny's evidence that Mr Meaney's demeanour during the first interview was "very low key, subdued, almost apologetic, rather than being aggressive in terms of strongly denying the allegations and defending the allegations10 must have been given in the context of the Appellant's usual demeanour as known to Mr Kenny. Therefore, the Deputy President was entitled to infer that Mr Meaney's demeanour was very low key, subdued, almost apologetic in comparison to his usual demeanour. We do not agree with the Respondent on this point. It seems clear to us having considered the evidence of Mr Kenny, given in cross-examination, that he did not consider it unusual that Mr Meaney was not aggressive when he denied the allegations. Mr Kenny's reaction to Mr Meaney's responses to the allegations (i) The Respondent submitted that Mr Kenny believed that Mr Meaney had admitted to behaving in an inappropriate and improper manner with the student by "placing his hand for a considerable period of time on her knee".11 This suggestion was rejected by Mr Wood. He maintained that Mr Kenny did not give any evidence to the effect that Mr Meaney admitted the allegations. It was simply Mr Kenny's "understanding" from the interview that Mr Meaney had admitted to doing something "improper"12. He said Mr Kenny's evidence was clear in that Mr Meaney, at the first interview, stated that the reason for the touch was by way of congratulations and encouragement. From Mr Kenny's evidence, particularly those parts of his evidence to which we were directed, we are unable to establish that Mr Meaney admitted to behaving in an inappropriate and improper manner with the student by placing his hand for a considerable period of time on her knee. Whilst that may have been Mr Kenny's belief, we are of the view that the evidence does not establish an admission to that effect by Mr Meaney. The Respondent submitted that, whilst Mr Kenny believed it would be a serious offence for a male teacher to place his hand on a female's student's knee for say two to three seconds in the course of thanking or congratulating her13, he (Mr Kenny) believed that something more than that had happened in this case. The Respondent submitted therefore, that when Mr Kenny said in his evidence that he believed there had been "inappropriate" and "improper" conduct he meant that he believed that something more than the placing of a hand on the knee for two to three seconds as a sign of thanks or congratulations had occurred. The Appellant submitted that the Deputy President, with his questions of Mr Kenny at page 229, showed that he placed weight on Mr Kenny's belief or attitude rather than Mr Kenny's evidence as to what was said by Mr Meaney at the interview. Mr Wood said, that notwithstanding Mr Kenny's view that "improper and inappropriate" conduct meant conduct more than the placing of a hand on the knee for two or three seconds as a sign of thanks or congratulations, there was no evidence from anyone that Mr Meaney had ever admitted to doing more than that. Mr Wood said that Mr Kenny had not spoken to the student and so there was absolutely no basis for his belief that the conduct that had occurred was "something more than that". From our examination of the transcript we agree with the Appellant's submission on this issue.
Mr Wood submitted that Mr Kenny's evidence was not clear that Mr Meaney admitted that he had used the words "crossed the boundary/barrier". In relation to the use of either of those words, Mr Wood emphasised that Mr Kenny stated at page 220 line 18:
We are not satisfied that Mr Kenny's evidence establishes that the Appellant admitted that he had "crossed the boundary/barrier". All we are prepared to accept, insofar as Mr Kenny's evidence is concerned on this point, is that words, such as "crossed the boundary/barrier", were used during the discussions, but that there was no admission on the part of the Appellant that he had used those words. (iii) Mr Kenny's evidence, the Respondent said, was clear that Mr Meaney had said that he did not know why he had put his hand on the student's leg and that he did not know what had come over him. Mr Wood, in response, submitted that the evidence of Mr Kenny was that, at the first interview Mr Meaney had said that he did not know why he had congratulated the student in the manner that he had. We were referred to transcript15 of the cross-examination of Mr Kenny by Mr Wood where the following exchange occurs:
The view of the Appellant is to be preferred on this issue as we believe Mr Kenny's responses have been taken out of context by the Respondent. In any case, we consider Mr Meaney's response to Mr Kenny that "it" was a spur of the moment type of thing, does little to prove whether Mr Meaney was innocent or guilty of conducting himself in an unprofessional and unacceptable manner. (c) The Interview of 10.15 a.m. on 8 July 1997 (i) Mr Wood contended that the Deputy President placed considerable reliance upon the evidence of Sister Brady and Mr Kenny in relation to the 10.15 a.m. interview. He submitted that the Deputy President's reliance on their evidence in that regard was both unfair given the circumstances of the interview and unjustified given the totality of evidence. As indicated later we have reservations about the manner in which the 10.15 a.m. interview was conducted and recorded. He further submitted that where an interview was not capable of independent verification it was not appropriate to act on the employer's account where it conflicts with that of the worker. We were referred to Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (1995) 62 IR 195 at 197. The Respondent submitted that what was said by Mr Meaney at that interview was a classic matter for the Deputy President to decide as it involved directly an issue of credit. The Respondent contended that Mohazab v Dick Smith was not authority for any general proposition that where an interview is not capable of independent verification, it is not appropriate to act on the employer's account alone. He said, it may well have been an appropriate approach in that case but there can be no principle of general application derived from that authority. The Respondent said, in this matter, there were two people present at the interview other than Mr Meaney and on this basis alone, the circumstances were altogether different. We agree with the Respondent on this matter. (ii) Mr Wood submitted that the Deputy President found that Mr Meaney was requested to respond to the allegations made against him, rather than required to respond as suggested in Mr Kenny's evidence.16
(d) "Crossed the barrier/boundary"
(e) Was the reason for the touch disclosed at the first meeting Mr Wood submitted that the Deputy President seemed to place some reliance on the evidence of Sister Brady that Mr Meaney did not give a reason for the touch in the first three meetings. Mr Wood said Sister Brady's evidence, in that regard, was contrary to the overwhelming weight of other evidence. The Respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the "overwhelming weight of evidence" was that Mr Meaney did not, until submitting his written response, give any reason for touching the student. It was only then that Sister Brady noted, for the first time, that he suggested he had touched the student as a form of encouragement,29 and that he did it on the spur of the moment and did not know why he did it.30 Mr Bessell submitted that it was never put to Sister Brady in cross-examination that the Appellant had told her at any time prior to submitting his written response, that his touching of the student was for the purpose of congratulating her or encouraging her. It was submitted therefore that Sister Brady's evidence on this point was unchallenged and must be accepted. Mr Wood submitted that the two interviews which occurred after the first meeting at 10.15 a.m. on 8 July did not involve the substance of the allegations. It was submitted that Mr Meaney's evidence was that at the first meeting he explained that his action was "to reassure" and "encourage" his student.31 When Mr Meaney responded formally he described his actions thus:
It was asserted that Mr Meaney's explanation was corroborated by the evidence of Mr Kenny. The transcript records, at page 209, part of Mr Kenny's evidence-in-chief when being led by Mr Bessell, as follows:
Mr Bessell reminded us that in his evidence-in-chief Mr Kenny32 had indicated that he believed the first time he knew that Mr Meaney was saying that the physical contact was in the context of it being a congratulatory expression or a sign of encouragement, was when he was told "later on". Subsequently, whilst under cross-examination by Mr Wood, the following was adduced from Mr Kenny33 :-
Mr Kenny was later asked by the Deputy President whether the word "thanks" was used in the first discussion, and Mr Kenny replied that it was.34 The Respondent contended Mr Meaney said he did not know why he had put his hand on the student's leg and did not know what had come over him,35 and when Sister Brady first questioned him he was unable to give any valid reason for why he acted the way he had36. On the other hand, Mr Wood submitted that Mr Kenny37 gave evidence that Mr Meaney had made the point that he did not know why he had done "it" and he did not know what had come over him. In referring to "it", Mr Wood said, he (Mr Kenny) was answering that Mr Meaney had said that he did not know why he (Mr Meaney) had thanked the student in the way that he had. Mr Wood submitted the contention of the Respondent was extremely misleading. The actual evidence, he said, was:
It seems from the Deputy President's decision that he preferred Sister Brady's evidence which was that Mr Meaney, prior to his written explanation, did not give as a reason for patting Ms A on the knee that it was as a gesture of thanks or encouragement and that he considered the general tenor of Mr Kenny's evidence to support Sister Brady's evidence. Mr Kenny's evidence, whilst difficult to follow initially, included an acknowledgement that Mr Meaney said he used the words "thank you" when he put his hand on Ms A's knee and that the discussion took place during the first meeting which is contrary to the evidence of Sister Brady on both points. In the circumstances we consider that the Deputy President erred in concluding that the general tenor of Mr Kenny's evidence supported that of Sister Brady. (f) Sister Brady's evidence
(g) Alleged weaknesses in Mr Meaney's case Mr Wood submitted that the only two weaknesses in Mr Meaney's evidence, cited by the Deputy President, arose from either a false assumption or a failure by the Deputy President to have regard for all the evidence. Both weaknesses were said to be related to Mr Meaney squatting beside the student instead of standing behind her. The Respondent argued that these two weaknesses could not have been the only weaknesses in the Appellant's evidence because the Deputy President "obviously did not accept the Appellant's version of the critical events". It was submitted that the squatting in close proximity to the student offered Mr Meaney the opportunity and the temptation to touch the student in an unacceptable manner. Mr Wood said it was common for persons to adopt a squatting or kneeling position in such circumstances and it was dangerous to infer improper intent as a result. As to the glare on the screen of the computer, Mr Wood submitted that neither he nor Mr Bessell had asked Mr Meaney what was the source of the glare to which he had referred. It was submitted that the Deputy President had introduced the drawn curtains factor assuming Mr Meaney had indicated the glare had been caused by the direct sunlight, but Mr Meaney had made no mention of any sunlight glare and the Deputy President's conclusion ignored the presence of fluourescent lights in the classroom as a source of glare. Mr Bessell submitted it was open to the Deputy President to infer there was less glare as a result of the drawn curtains and so regard that as a weakness in Mr Meaney's evidence. Mr Wood also said the Deputy President's reliance on evidence that Mr Meaney had not been known before to squat beside students ignored evidence that usually a student sat to the left which would have precluded any squatting or kneeling beside a student. As to the reasons for squatting, the Respondent submitted the predominant evidence was that there had been a chair to the left of the student; moreover the squatting gave Mr Meaney the opportunity to do what was alleged. We accept the Appellant's submissions in relation to the "glare" on the computer screen and acknowledge that the transcript contains no reference to the source of the glare. However we did not have the benefit of an inspection of the classroom as was available to the Deputy President, and we will not interfere with his assessment of the conditions in the classroom. As to the second matter we agree with the Respondent that the preponderance of evidence was that there was a chair in the vacant spot to the left of Ms A. Mr Wood noted that the Deputy President had posed a number of questions as part of his reasons for finding misconduct and submitted it was an error to rely on unresolved questions as evidence of guilt when a hypothesis, consistent with innocence, remained open in relation to those questions. The questions were: Why squat? Why insist on seeing Ms A alone after class? Why be low key at the 10.15 a.m. meeting? and Why would an apparently normal student of fifteen years make up or exaggerate a story against Mr Meaney? Mr Wood submitted that explanations consistent with Mr Meaney's innocence in respect of three of the unanswered questions were not positively excluded by the evidence: in particular that Mr Meaney squatted to be at eye level because of the glare; that he saw the student alone after class to apologise for making her uncomfortable; and that it was his normal demeanour not to be aggressive and Mr Kenny was not surprised that Mr Meaney was low key at the interview. As to the fourth question raised by the Deputy President, Mr Wood submitted that it was not Mr Meaney's responsibility to explain why the student would make up or exaggerate a story against him. Mr Wood submitted that the onus was on the Respondent to explain that. Further, he repeated the Deputy President actually found that the student had exaggerated her evidence. Mr Bessell submitted there was no requirement for the Respondent to exclude all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence and he said the Deputy President did not rely, in isolation, on the unresolved questions in determining the critical issues. Mr Bessell submitted that where, as in this case, the civil standard of proof applies, unresolved questions, even if reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence exist, are matters which a tribunal is entitled to take into account together with all of the other evidence. He submitted the Deputy President was entitled to consider these unresolved and circumstantial issues and give them such weight, in the light of other evidence, as he thought appropriate. We have concern about the unanswered questions posed by the Deputy President but we consider that the Deputy President did not rely on those questions when determining the essential issues before him. (h) The Commission's duty to make findings of fact
The evidence of the "eye witness" student, Mr E, at pages 73 and 75 of transcript, was put forward in support of the claim that the touch was one of encouragement. The evidence of Mr Kenny at pages 209, 220 and 221 was referred to again which Mr Wood maintained indicated that at the first interview Mr Meaney made the comment he was just giving Ms A a "pat of encouragement or saying thank you, saying well done". Mr Wood submitted that it was only Sister Brady who thought there was some other intent behind the touch. Despite the evidence of Mr Meaney and Mr Kenny, Sister Brady did not recall Mr Meaney saying at the first interview that the reason was to encourage or thank the student. It was submitted the Deputy President could not make a determination as to whether the nature of the touching amounted to conduct which was a valid reason for termination of employment without making specific findings as to the position, length and intent of the touch. He claimed there was no finding that Mr Meaney had touched the student on the leg in addition to the touching on the knee, and no finding that Mr Meaney had touched the student on the leg, other than on the knee. He claimed there was no finding that Mr Meaney had rubbed the student's knee or leg, and the absence of such a finding meant that the Deputy President was not satisfied that such occurred. Similarly the absence of a finding that Mr Meaney had touched the student under the skirt meant that the Deputy President was not satisfied that such had occurred. We were asked by Mr Wood to note the evidence of the student that when seated her skirt covered her knee and so even a touch under the skirt would be on the knee. The Respondent submitted that the essential matters the Deputy President was required to adjudicate upon were: (i) Was there a valid reason for the Appellant's dismissal? (ii) If there was not, what orders should be made? (iii) If there was, what, if any, orders should be made? Mr Bessell said the Deputy President found that the Appellant had, during the early part of periods 7 and 8 on 7 July 1997, conducted himself in an unprofessional and unacceptable manner in his dealing with the student and that he did so on at least one occasion by touching her on the knee and leg in a manner which brought discomfort to the student. He therefore found that there was a valid reason for the Appellant's dismissal. The Deputy President then, as he was obliged to do pursuant to section 31(1A) of the Act, took into account the matters referred to in that sub-section, and found that the general tenets of procedural fairness had been satisfied. It was submitted that the Deputy President made findings with respect to all the essential elements upon which he was required to base his decision. It was submitted that there was no requirement to make specific findings of the position, length, and intent of the touch. The issue before the Deputy President was whether the nature of the touching amounted to conduct which was a valid reason for termination of employment. By finding the touching constituted unprofessional and unacceptable conduct, it was clear, Mr Bessell submitted, that the Deputy President did not accept that the touching was of the nature alleged by Mr Meaney. Mr Bessell submitted that by finding that there had been a touching of the leg in addition to a touching of the knee, it must be inferred that the student's account of where the touching occurred was accepted, that is, there had been a touching of the leg of the nature of a rubbing motion under the dress. Mr Bessell said this must be inferred as this was the only evidence of a touching of the leg during period 7. The Commission's attention was directed to the evidence of Ms A at pages 170, 172, 173, 174, 184; of Ms Lagerewskij at pages 244, 247, 248; of Ms A's mother at page 201; of Sister Brady at page 117 and 150; and Exhibit B2, Sister Brady's notes. Mr Bessell said it was clear from the Deputy President's decision that he found the touching was not "innocent" and was not a brief tap or touching of the knee alone, to reassure, encourage, thank or congratulate the student. He submitted that it was simply wrong to suggest that there was overwhelming evidence that the intent behind Mr Meaney's touch was completely innocent and was one of encouragement and/or congratulation. It was submitted that the Deputy President made adequate specific findings of fact upon which to base his decision and that to have made more detailed findings of fact was not only not required, but would have unnecessarily prejudiced Mr Meaney by highlighting details of his misconduct. Mr Bessell submitted that if the Full Bench was of the view that the Deputy President should have made more specific findings of fact, then it would be appropriate, pursuant to section 70(13)(c) of the Act, for the matter to be remitted back to the Deputy President for that purpose. However the Respondent's primary submission was that the appropriate order for the Full Bench to make is to confirm the decision of the Deputy President as there is no basis to interfere with any of his findings. Mr Wood submitted that it would be inappropriate for the matter to be remitted back to the Deputy President simply for him to make more specific findings of fact and that the Full Bench should make its own decision on the basis of all the evidence that was before the Deputy President at first instance. 6. Findings We have considered all the material put to us by way of oral and written submissions and before recording our conclusions in this matter we consider it is appropriate that we make the following observations which in part duplicate some earlier findings. The Commission's primary responsibility in matters where unfair dismissal is alleged, is to be satisfied that the employment of a worker has not been terminated without a valid reason. This requirement is imposed on a Commissioner by section 31(1A) of the Act which requires a Commissioner, before making an order pursuant to section 31(1) of the Act, to take into account the standards of general application contained in Part II of the ILO Convention concerning the Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer. According to the Convention the employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for termination which must be "connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service".49 The Convention further requires that employment shall not be terminated for reasons related to the worker's conduct or performance before the worker is provided with the opportunity to defend himself or herself against the allegations.50 A Commissioner is required to examine the reasons for termination "and the other circumstances relating to the case" and to render a decision "on whether the termination was justified".51 The burden of proving the existence of a valid reason for the termination rests on the employer52; and/or the Commissioner may reach a conclusion on the reason for the termination having regard to the evidence provided by the parties and according to law and practice.53 Our concern in this matter, in the context of the Convention, is to establish that the Deputy President considered all the essential material; was satisfied that a valid reason existed for the termination of Mr Meaney's employment and was satisfied that appropriate procedures, in keeping with the Convention, were followed prior to and when the termination was effected. In arriving at a conclusion in respect of an application made pursuant to section 29 of the Act, we agree with the Appellant that members of this Commission should comply with the general requirements set out by Zeeman J. in Attorney-General (Tas) v John Stewart Smith insofar as it is necessary to make any findings in respect of the essential facts. In this case it is conceded by the Appellant that the Deputy President found correctly that Mr Meaney "touched the student on the knee". We agree that is so. Given the lack of independent witnesses and conflicting evidence in this matter we have concluded that the only relevant unchallenged facts concerning the events of periods 7 and 8 on 7 July 1997 are:
The Deputy President's decision records that he would have found Mr Meaney's dismissal was wrong and ordered his reinstatement if he could have been satisfied that Mr Meaney's action was part of a thanking or encouragement gesture. It is obvious that, having considered the evidence, the Deputy President was not satisfied that Mr Meaney touched Ms A on the knee and leg as part of a thanking and encouragement gesture. We consider that such a conclusion was open to the Deputy President having had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses give their evidence. Even though the Deputy President appears to have misinterpreted the evidence of Mr Kenny as to whether Mr Meaney, at interview, said it was such a gesture we do not consider that misinterpretation had a negative effect on the Deputy President's overall assessment of the evidence. We do not accept the Respondent's submission that it should be inferred from the Deputy President's decision that he found that Mr Meaney touched Ms A by way of a "rubbing motion under the dress". However we accept the Respondent's submission that there was no "overwhelming evidence" as suggested by the Appellant, that the intent behind Mr Meaney's touch was completely innocent. We do not accept the Appellant's contention that it was necessary for the Deputy President to make any further findings as to the position on the leg that the touch occurred, or to the length or the intent of the touch other than those which are set out in his decision. We agree with the Respondent's submission that the Deputy President's primary task was to establish whether or not he considered there was a valid reason for Mr Meaney's dismissal. The conclusion by the Deputy President that Mr Meaney's action, that is, touching Ms A on the knee and leg on at least one occasion, was unprofessional and unacceptable was based, primarily it seems to us, on the views of Sister Brady and Mr Kenny. No other evidence or material was put to the Deputy President to establish what was regarded as either professional or unacceptable conduct for teachers, male or female, when touching or required to touch a student, male or female. In the circumstances it was open to the Deputy President, on that material, to come to the conclusion that Mr Meaney's action was both unprofessional and unacceptable. Whilst we may not have found against Mr Meaney in the precise terms used by the Deputy President, we consider Mr Meaney's conduct on the day in question, no matter how well intentioned it may have been in the mind of Mr Meaney, was certainly unacceptable, if not unprofessional. We further consider that Mr Meaney's conduct as outlined and conceded was such as to constitute misconduct for the purposes of the Catholic Education Award. We note in this context that Clause 17 - Contract of Employment - contained in the Catholic Education Award (the relevant award) states in subclause (m):
As to the question of procedural fairness, we have noted at page 15 of the decision that there were some deficiencies in the procedures adopted by the employer connected with the interview at 10.15 a.m. on 8 July 1997, but that they were not sufficient to persuade us to uphold the appeal. Accordingly, in respect of Ground 1 of the appeal we consider that the Deputy President's finding that the applicant conducted himself in an "unprofessional and unacceptable manner" was a finding open to him as the Commission member dealing with the matter at first instance. Therefore we find that Ground 1 of the appeal has not been substantiated. In respect of Ground 2, we consider that the evidence was capable of supporting a finding to the requisite standard that the Applicant had committed an act which constituted misconduct. Therefore we find that Ground 2 of the appeal has not been substantiated. In respect of Ground 3, we consider that the Deputy President made sufficient findings of fact to support a conclusion that the Applicant conducted himself in an unprofessional and unacceptable manner. In our view, on Mr Meaney's evidence alone, we have concluded that his action on 7 July 1997, was misconduct for the purposes of the Catholic Education Award and therefore constitutes a valid reason for the employer to decide to terminate his employment. Therefore we find that Ground 3 of the appeal has not been substantiated. In the circumstances the appeal is dismissed and we confirm the decision of Deputy President King in Matter T7125 of 1997 dated 24 November 1997.
F D Westwood REASONS FOR DECISION IMLACH C. (DISSENTING) I have read the decision of the President and Commissioner Watling and concur with it in nearly all respects, particularly in relation to the relevant unchallenged facts, but for the reasons set out below, I do not agree with their ultimate conclusion that the Appellant was guilty of misconduct warranting the termination of his employment. I uphold this appeal on all three grounds. As to the first ground the only evidence the Deputy President could have relied upon properly was the admission of the Appellant that he had touched the student on the knee. Apart from the evidence of the student and the evidence of the only other direct witness (which was favourable to the Appellant, but, discounted by the Deputy President) there was no other reliable evidence as to what had happened in the relevant incident. All other key witnesses gave evidence as to what had happened after the incident and what was their attitude and assessment of the incident. There was no corroborative evidence whatsoever (except that in favour of the Appellant discounted by the Deputy President) relating to the primary evidence. In this context and in the light of the requisite standard of proof, as covered by the second ground of the appeal, I accept that the weight of the evidence was inadequate. Putting aside the student's reaction, the only clear evidence of what happened in the incident was the Appellant's admission that he touched the student on the knee. There was no conclusive evidence as to the intent of the touch. In the absence of any clear noli me tangere policy on the part of the employer, I am not prepared to accept that the Appellant's actions were such as to warrant the termination of his employment. This is not to say that I endorse the practice of touching students on the knee or suchlike, which I do not, however, I consider the school management's attitude to have been a contributory factor in this case in that it failed to have a definite, established policy on the matter of touching when it should have. The Appellant's actions in seeking to apologise privately to the student, in hindsight, were ill advised, but, in today's climate quite understandable and I do not take them as contributory in any way. In upholding the second ground of the Appellant's appeal, I agree that the standard of proof in this matter was not that of beyond reasonable doubt, but, I consider, because of the serious nature of the allegation and the ramifications of an adverse finding against the Appellant, the standard under the balance of probabilities ought to have been reasonably strong. Based upon what I have already said about the evidence in this case, I am satisfied that it was incapable of supporting a finding to the requisite standard that the Appellant's actions were such as to warrant the termination of his employment. Contrary to the Respondent's submissions I believe a study of the High Court Briginshaw54 decision confirms this view. On the evidence I am not reasonably satisfied that there had been any impropriety and I am unable to see that the Deputy President could have been so satisfied. In the same way, as before, I consider the subject matter of the third ground in this appeal impinges on the second ground in that there was no reason or evidence adduced by the Deputy President to explain how or why he was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant's actions warranted the termination of his employment. As to the third ground of this appeal, the only relevant finding the Deputy President made was that the Appellant had "conducted himself in an unprofessional and unacceptable manner ... by touching her on the knee and leg in a manner that brought discomfort to the student." I consider that this finding was inadequate and not sufficient to show, on the balance of probabilities, that the Appellant had done what was alleged. The expression or concept of "unprofessional and unacceptable conduct" appears to have arisen during the original hearing in evidence given by the witnesses Brady and Kenny who both were of the firm opinion that an act of impropriety had taken place, but, they were not direct witnesses to the incident. I also regard those same witnesses as less than independent. In the absence of some kind of definition or explanation the phrase does not clearly relate to the original allegation which implied molestation or sexual impropriety: the Deputy President certainly did not find that the Appellant had so conducted himself. The fact that the Deputy President seems to have been satisfied that there was sexual impropriety is of no assistance because he did not say so. For example the Deputy President asked a lot of questions which were in effect rhetorical because they were not answered. This failure of the Deputy President to make clear findings thwarts any argument that the ultimate decision he took was open to him and within his discretion. The Deputy President also found that it was the manner of the touch by the Appellant which brought discomfort to the student. Again, if the touch was merely a congratulatory tap as claimed by the Appellant, the student's reaction was entirely subjective and should not have been relied upon. The Appellant relied on a decision of Zeeman J, in the matter Attorney General (Tas) v Smith (A87/1994) in the Appellate jurisdiction which referred to a failure by a trial judge to state reasons for preferring one version. The decision actually followed another decision, Australian Securities Commission v Schrender (A79/1994). The relevant principles required that the Workers Compensation Commissioner:
I do not see that any less standard ought to apply in this jurisdiction particularly in this matter and on the basis of these principles I accept that the Deputy President, "failed to make any or sufficient findings of fact to support a conclusion that the Appellant conducted himself in an unprofessional and unacceptable manner". For all these reasons I uphold the appeal.
P A Imlach Appearances: Date and place of hearing: 1 Extract from original Notice of Appeal, Tasmanian Industrial Commission T7387 of 1997 |